Many years later, when people look back at the world politics of the 2020s, they will remember a not-exaggerated image: a former Prime Minister of Singapore, speaking calmly in different international forums, but reminding the audience over and over again - don't regard China as "another Soviet Union." In May 2024, he stepped down as Prime Minister and became Senior Advisor, handing over the reins to Lawrence Wong, but his views have not changed; by 2025, he is still speaking out. His name is Lee Hsien Loong, and his long-term experience in governing on the tightrope between China and the United States has given his judgment a calmness close to the front line. As early as the 2021 Aspen Security Forum, he said bluntly: China is not the Soviet Union, and the old methods of the United States will not work.

Where did the tactics that brought the Soviet Union down come from?

To understand the weight of this statement, you have to look back at how the “old ways” worked. Immediately after World War II ended, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union had already taken shape. The United States launched an arms race, forcing the Soviet Union to increase its investment in nuclear weapons and missiles. The Soviet Union was an industrial power, but it was "heavily equipped" under the planned economy: heavy industry was overwhelming, light industry was weak, and daily consumer goods had to be imported to fill the gap. The United States and its allies responded accordingly and formed a strict export control system, which blocked key links in high technology and energy. As time went by, the Soviet Union's domestic structural contradictions were continuously amplified: the military expenditure burden was heavy, the national economy was stretched, and the proxy war in Afghanistan was more like adding salt to the wound. By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended with a crash. The US strategy seemed "effective" in that round.

Popular science: The "stuck neck" at that time was not abstract. During the Cold War, the West coordinated export controls under the NATO framework and set hard thresholds for dual-use technologies. The Soviet Union had strong heavy industry and a short chain of consumption and technology. Once it was blocked, alternative paths were limited. According to common academic estimates, military spending accounts for more than 15% of GDP. This means that for every 100 yuan earned, 15 yuan or more will be spent to fill the armament hole. In the long run, domestic demand and people's livelihood will naturally be squeezed.

It is also a confrontation between great powers, but the chassis is completely different.

The differences emphasized by Lee Hsien Loong are first of all the economic chassis. The Soviet Union was closed and self-reliant, with a multi-ethnic mix and a rigid system; China has been reforming and opening up since 1978, and has been deeply embedded in the global trade chain. By 2024, China's GDP will exceed US$18 trillion, with a complete industrial chain and rapid supporting facilities, and companies can flexibly switch between global markets. When the United States imposes additional tariffs, China does not just have to "bear it". Diversion to Southeast Asia or other markets becomes a realistic option, and the supply chain shows resilience. In contrast, the Soviet Union was restricted by bulk exports such as oil, and once prices rose or fell, the whole country would be affected.

More importantly, it is the stability and mobilization ability of political society. The Soviet Union was a patchwork of multiple ethnic groups. Once "penetrated", the centrifugal force would expand; in Lee Hsien Loong's eyes, China used a long history as a cohesive agent. National unity and political stability can form the ability to concentrate on doing major things at critical moments - from the rescue of the Wenchuan earthquake to the response to the COVID-19 epidemic, the state apparatus has demonstrated the strength of organization and mobilization. In such a social environment, it is difficult to simply replicate the old trick of "ideological infiltration". The so-called "cultural self-confidence" is not a slogan, but the underlying structure of public psychology.

The ledger of the arms race, who is pulling the long strings?

The "arms drag" that worked for the Soviet Union encountered resistance here in China. The proportion of the Soviet Union's military expenditure has been high for many years, squeezing the breadth of people's livelihood and science and technology; China emphasizes controlling military expenditure within a reasonable range, and takes independent research and development as its main line, unwilling to be involved in an endless quantity competition. The scenario of Huawei being included in the Entity List and having its chips jammed was supposed to replicate the blockade effect of the Cold War, but it actually led to the self-research of the Kirin series and continued leadership in 5G technology. Compared with the Soviet Union's "stuck" back then, this is a different technological path - between blockade and anti-blockade, there was a rebound of "forced innovation".

Can technological blockade and economic and trade decoupling really be decoupled?

After the trade war started in 2018, layers of tariffs were imposed. The United States wields the tariff stick, and China's retaliatory tariffs follow suit. But what appears in the trade figures is not a total collapse. In 2023, China's trade volume with ASEAN will increase significantly, and the "buffer zone" role of Southeast Asia will be clear. By 2025, Trump once again threatened tariffs of up to 100%, and Beijing responded with "firm counterattacks." Export controls around rare earths have begun to be implemented in detail, U.S. port and logistics costs have increased, and corporate supply chain planning has once again been disrupted. The "One Belt, One Road" circle of friends is getting larger and larger, with more than 150 cooperating countries, making it difficult for China's position in the global network to be cut off at a single point. This is in sharp contrast to the relative isolation of the Soviet Union in the international economic system during the Cold War.

Another line: from the post-war starting point to the end in 1991

But going back to the long shot of that period of history, the Soviet Union was not without confidence at the beginning of the Cold War: it had a huge industrial system and remarkable military technology. However, the rigidity of the planned economy made "arms priority" almost a system fate. There is a shortage of consumer goods, restrictions on technology imports, and a sense of sluggishness in daily life is accumulating. The war in Afghanistan is a watershed: it consumes manpower and material resources and its international image is damaged, and domestic dissatisfaction rises. NATO's ever-expanding security pressure has become another invisible bill. After years of overdraft, the disintegration in the winter of 1991 was no accident.

From 2018 to 2025: Rounds, retracements and rebounds

If the Sino-US game from 2018 to 2025 is regarded as a multi-round game, the nodes are not difficult to find. In 2018, the United States signed a steel and aluminum tariff order, starting a trade war in name only; in 2019, Huawei entered the entity list; after the change of government, the intensity has not weakened. The 2022 chip bill will shift to subsidizing local semiconductors and cooperate with stricter export restrictions. By 2025, the game will continue to escalate. On the surface, the pressure continues to increase; however, at the same time, China's foreign trade data gives another narrative: exports in September 2025 will increase by 2.4% year-on-year, exceeding the expectations of many analysts. The adaptability of enterprises has blossomed at the micro level: production conversion, line changes, hedging, and emerging sectors such as electric vehicles and photovoltaics have taken the lead in the global market. The Soviet Union's single reliance on "profits trembled as soon as oil prices fell" and China's decentralized layout of "a full range of manufacturing industries" show different elasticities in resisting shocks.

The debate over the concept of order, export or coexistence

During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union was generally regarded as a force that "exported revolution", which easily provoked a systemic confrontational balance. When Lee Hsien Loong evaluated China in a speech in 2019, his words were quite measured: China adopts market principles but has no intention of subverting the existing order. This view of order brings another diplomatic posture: emphasizing peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit. In practice, the “One Belt and One Road” initiative relies on infrastructure construction in exchange for economic, trade and resource complementarity; while the United States is wooing allies to “contain” it, China’s projects in Latin America, Africa and Eurasia have expanded new connectivity lines. By 2025, Sino-US friction has not subsided, but the communication channels established by the "San Francisco Summit" are still there, and cooperation on climate issues has not been interrupted. The expansion space in these slits shows that the relationship between the two countries is not a complete zero-sum situation.

Comparison of internal structures: two trends of stability and cleavage

Lee Hsien Loong repeatedly emphasized that the Soviet Union's "multi-ethnic patchwork" made it more likely to break up under impact; China's "long history of strong mobilization" has given the political and social structure a stable inertia. From the Wenchuan earthquake to epidemic prevention and control, organizational and execution capabilities in crises have brought a sense of reality of "getting difficult things done." It is precisely for this reason that it is difficult to shake the overall operation by relying solely on the infiltration of ideological fronts; cultural confidence and national identity are spread in details, becoming a grassroots consensus that is "not easily provoked".

Differences in paths of technology and innovation

There is another seemingly technical difference, but it actually relates to long-term competitiveness. The impression given to the outside world of the late Soviet Union’s technology was that it relied mostly on imitation, and it was difficult to move forward when faced with blockade. However, China’s innovation ecosystem has been evolving both quantitatively and qualitatively over the past ten years. The number of patent applications ranks first in the world, and the export share of high-tech products will exceed 30% in 2024. These are not just numbers. The leadership in 5G and the independent investment in chips after being jammed show that the chain of "blockade-anti-blockade-new equilibrium" can form an industrial rebound. This logic did not appear in the Soviet Union.

"Learning from history can help us understand the ups and downs."

If the experience of success and failure of that year is simply repeated, misjudgment will inevitably occur. The secret to bringing down the Soviet Union was the double squeeze of economic isolation and armament drag; but in the face of China, external isolation was difficult to be fully effective, and internal drag did not appear. Compared with the Soviet model, which accounted for more than 15% of military expenditure, China emphasizes a "reasonable range" defense budget; compared with the Soviet Union's high dependence on energy exports, China's exports are diversified and the manufacturing industry has a longer depth. More critical is the resilience of the underlying social structure: market orientation and global embeddedness give room for reconfiguration.

Costs and Reminders: How Misjudgment Will Come Back

Lee Hsien Loong is not only talking about history, he is also reminding the price. Trade war is a tool that hurts both others and itself. In recent years, there have been endless discussions about high inflation and pressure on economic growth in the United States. The worry of "shrinking GDP" has appeared in public opinion more than once. Repeated moves in the supply chain and rising port and logistics costs are all visible friction costs. In contrast, China has hedged against the impact by expanding domestic demand and diversifying exports. In October 2025, September export data once again beat expectations; Trump once again threatened 100% tariffs, and Beijing responded with export controls on key materials such as rare earths. The supply and demand matching on the corporate side was once again forced to be rearranged. This time and again, the metaphor of "injuring the enemy a thousand times and damaging oneself eight hundred" was mentioned frequently, like high-cost force.

Not to expand, but to hold the threshold

The Soviet Union’s advance in Afghanistan carried an expansion narrative; China’s positions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait were defined as “core interests” and did not resort to global military expansion. There are obvious differences in the paths between the two in terms of external image and internal resource allocation. After the Cold War, the United States went through a brief period of "one superpower and dominance", and then turned its attention to China. However, facing a larger opponent with a deeper supply chain and a more dynamic market, the simple "old spectrum and new bombs" appear to be weak.

Let’s talk about Lee Hsien Loong again: the recoil of

The counselor, who will hand over power in May 2024, repeated his advice: treating China like the Soviet Union will only hurt the United States. He did not deny the need for competition, but emphasized the reality of "non-zero sum". In his words, cooperation is what must be done; strategies focusing on tariffs and blockades can only be expedient and cannot achieve the overall situation. In his long-term experience in governing Singapore, the security and prosperity of a small country depend on the coordination of big countries - "Soldiers are the most important thing in the country", but soldiers are not only swords and guns, but also rules, channels and trust.

Epilogue: The old road is dead, the new road requires patience

Looking back at this story, it is not difficult to find that the clues have already been written on the wall: the Soviet Union's set of structural weaknesses that could bring down the Soviet Union did not reappear in China in equal proportion. A market-oriented economy, a globalized industrial chain, robust social mobilization, and prudent and sustained investment in science and technology. These factors are intertwined and constitute soft and hard resistance to the "re-version of the Cold War." Tensions will continue in 2025, and news about tariffs, lists, and bills will not stop; but as long as communication channels like the San Francisco Summit remain and cooperation on global issues such as climate is not broken, there will still be room for maneuver.

History does not simply rhyme, but it always tries to remind people: tricks are useful, provided the targets are the same. The object has changed, and the abacus must also be changed. Head-on conversation isn't romantic, it's just the more realistic option. Comparing the two trajectories of the Soviet Union and China, Lee Hsien Loong's words are like a small wedge, stuck between hasty judgment and high price, suggesting another, not easy but safer path.